














This paper examines what we can say about the extent and impact of corruption in 
infrastructure in developing countries using existing evidence.  It looks at different 
approaches to estimating the extent of corruption and reports on the results of such 
studies.  It suggests that there is considerable evidence that most existing perceptions 
measures appear to be very weak proxies for the actual extent of corruption in the 
infrastructure sector, largely (but inaccurately) measuring petty rather than grand 
corruption.  Existing survey evidence is more reliable, but limited in extent and still 
subject to sufficient uncertainty that it should not be used as a tool for differentiating 
countries in terms of access to infrastructure finance or appropriate policy models.  The 
paper discusses evidence for the relative costs of corruption impacts and suggests that a 
focus on bribe payments as the indicator of the costs of corruption in infrastructure may 
be misplaced.  It draws some conclusions regarding priorities for infrastructure anti-
corruption research and activities in projects, in particular regarding disaggregated and 
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This paper examines what we can say about the extent and impact of corruption in 
infrastructure in developing countries using existing evidence.  A low-end estimate 
suggests that the financial costs of corruption in infrastructure investment and 
maintenance alone in developing countries might equal $18bn a year.  There is 
considerable evidence of widespread petty corruption in the area of infrastructure 
connections as well as larger-scale corruption to gain construction contracts and licenses 
and even to change regulatory and policy practices.  For example, perhaps 25 percent of 
electricity production is lost to illegal connections in India, as much as 24 percent of 
funds destined for road construction in a project in Indonesia ‘went missing’ and in the 
region of seven percent of government contract values are paid in bribes according to 
survey respondents in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
 
At the same time many of our existing measures appear to be very weak proxies for the 
actual extent of corruption, and in particular grand corruption, in infrastructure.  This 
applies especially to perceptions-based evidence.  At the cross-country level, 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) appears to be a lagging, 
rather than leading indicator of corruption scandals.  In Indonesia, perceptions of 
corruption in a road project were weakly related to levels of corruption measured by 
physical and financial audit.  They were also systematically biased, with higher 
perceived, and lower audited, levels of corruption in ethnically diverse communities.  
Overall, perceptions indicators are weakly correlated with available survey evidence 
regarding corruption in construction and utilities, and weakly correlated with 
infrastructure outcomes. 
 
Survey responses provide considerably more accurate measures of both petty and grand 
corruption.  In Eastern Europe and Central Asia, a large scale survey suggests that levels 
of corruption are different in construction firms than in other firms across countries, but 
that the nature of those differences varies by country.  In turn this suggests that even 
accurate general indicators of corruption at the macro level may ill-reflect sectoral 
realities.   
 
Even with large surveys, noise remains.  The survey results from Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia allows us to make two different estimates of the percentage of company 
revenues paid in bribes for contracts based on survey responses.  These two different 
estimates are correlated, but with some considerable error (see Figure 2).  Again, looking 
at construction company responses about the level of corruption in construction 
contracting in their country suggests that answers do not reflect a strong common 
understanding of sectoral corruption. The survey data allows us to say only a limited 
amount with confidence about variation across countries in levels of corruption in the 
construction industry (see Figure Four) and it does not provide sufficient accuracy to 
provide an ‘actionable indicator’.  (It should be noted that this was not an intended aim of 
the survey designers).  Furthermore, existing surveys do not and probably could not 
capture levels of grand corruption in infrastructure firms themselves.   3
 
Evidence for the relative costs of corruption impacts suggests that a sole focus on bribe 
payments as the indicator of the costs of corruption in infrastructure is misplaced.  Bribes 
that are paid in order to win contracts for well-selected projects that are subsequently 
well-constructed are less damaging than corruption which skews spending priorities or 
lowers construction standards.  In Indonesia, one estimate is that each dollar stolen from 
road construction reduces economic benefits from the road by $3.41.  Ten percent 
additional project costs due to corrupt payments cannot account for the negligible 
macroeconomic returns to public investment in Africa, but expenditure diversion and 
poor construction related in part to corruption might. 
 
Such findings suggest priorities for infrastructure anti-corruption research and activities 
in projects.  Evidence on the extent of perceived bribery is only to some degree related to 
actual levels of bribe payments, and the level of bribe payments are a weak proxy for the 
development impact of corruption.  A focus on inputs and outputs might provide better 
evidence of weak governance and high corruption in infrastructure, and in particular on 
the development impact of these problems.  Such a focus would involve an evaluation of 
budgeting priorities and project selection procedures as well as the quality of construction 
of selected projects at the sectoral level.  There remains an important place for focused, 
well-designed, large surveys to evaluate modes and levels of corruption in a particular 
environments, and potential policy responses.  There also remains a place for improved 
procurement and detection procedures at the project level.  But perhaps the most efficient 
tools for measuring and reducing the development impact of corruption at the sectoral 
level will have a broad governance focus.   4
Introduction 
 
Estimates regarding the cost of corruption in infrastructure suggest that 5 to 20 percent of 
construction costs are being lost to bribe payments, and as much as 20 to 30 percent of 
electricity is being stolen by consumers in collusion with staff (Gulati and Rao, 2006).  
Assuming that 5 percent of investment and maintenance costs in infrastructure are lost to 




This paper examines what we can say about the extent and impact of corruption in 
infrastructure in developing countries using existing evidence.  It discusses both petty 
corruption (here taken to include ‘speed payments’ and other small bribes to obtain 
everyday services) and grand corruption (including payments to secure government 
contracts or major licenses, change regulations or influence the shape of laws).  It looks 
at different approaches to estimating the extent of corruption (expert perceptions, 
surveys, indirect techniques) and reports on the results of such studies.  It suggests that 
there is considerable evidence that most existing perceptions measures appear to be very 
weak proxies for the actual extent of corruption in the infrastructure sector, largely (but 
inaccurately) measuring petty rather than grand corruption.  Existing survey evidence is 
more reliable, but limited in extent and still subject to some uncertainty.  The paper 
discusses evidence for the relative costs of corruption impacts and suggests that a focus 
on bribe payments as the indicator of the costs of corruption in infrastructure may be 
misplaced.  It draws some conclusions regarding priorities for infrastructure anti-
corruption research and activities in projects, in particular regarding disaggregated and 
actionable indicators of weak governance and corruption. 
 
 
Making Estimates of the Extent of Corruption in Infrastructure 
 
One direct way to examine the extent of corruption in a country or sector is to look at 
cases where it has been revealed as part of a criminal investigation.  Of course, such a 
technique is open to a number of serious biases –for example, there will be more cases 
where the justice system is efficient, itself less corrupt, and is focusing on the prosecution 
of corruption.  There will also be more cases when corrupt activities themselves are less 
sophisticated and easier to detect.  As a result, other approaches are usually preferred if 
attempting to make cross-country or cross-sectoral evaluations of corruption, most 
commonly involving perceptions, surveys and indirect measures. 
 
The extent of corruption is most frequently illustrated through ‘corruption perception’ 
indices.  Assessments (including elements of Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index and the Economist Intelligence Unit rankings) ask ‘experts’ including 
senior corporate officials to rank their perceptions of the level of corruption in various 
countries.   
 
                                                 
2 Based on investment and maintenance estimates from Fay and Yepes, 2003.   5
Such studies rarely lead to direct dollar estimates of the extent of bribery or economic 
impacts, especially at the sectoral level, but they can be used as an independent variable 
in regression analysis to provide evidence of correlations between high perceived 
corruption and poor development outcomes.  For example, across countries, high 
perceived general levels of corruption are associated with lower spending on proxies for 
operations and maintenance.  Related to this, general perceptions of corruption have been 
associated with lower quality infrastructure (a lower percentage of roads in good 
condition and more frequent power outages for example) (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998).  
We will see, however, that such results are not robust, probably reflecting the weakness 
of general perceptions indices in measuring the extent of corruption in infrastructure. 
 
Survey techniques can question victims directly about the extent and level of corruption 
they face.  At the level of petty corruption, Davis (2004) used a survey approach to 
estimate that the average speed payment or bribe made to get connected to piped water in 
India works out at $2.64 per legal customer (see also Seligson, 2005).  There are a few 
other firm and customer surveys that have included questions on the extent of petty 
corruption in infrastructure service provision, including the World Bank’s business 
environment surveys and customer surveys in countries including India, Kenya and Peru. 
 
At the level of grand corruption, Hobbes (2005) interviewed a small number of bidders 
on World Bank financed projects and suggested that “all experienced bidders know that 
they must offer bribes in order not just to win the contract, but also successfully 
implement it.”  He suggests that bribes are usually between 10-15 percent of the contract 
value, often recovered in the mark-up the bidder places on the unit prices of the 
procurement items.  Soreide (2004) has conducted a similar, but considerably larger and 
more robust, survey covering international contractors based in Norway.  Neither of these 
surveys provide infrastructure- or construction-specific data, however. 
 
The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) covers over 
4000 firms in 22 transition countries and was conducted for the first time in 1999-2000.  
The survey examines a wide range of interactions between firms and the state.
3  It is the 
largest and most detailed cross-country survey including a wide range of questions 
regarding both petty and grand corruption that has been carried out.  The assumption of 
the survey is that many of the interviewed firms will be directly involved in corruption, 
although (for obvious reasons) survey questions tend to revolve around the corrupt 
activities of ‘a typical firm in your industry’ rather than asking directly about corrupt 
activities of the respondent firm.   
 
In 1999, the median firm reported spending one to two percent of its revenues on 
unofficial payments to public officials.
4  At the aggregate level, across the region, the 
average firm suggests that it divides up its illicit payment budget as follows: 28 percent to 
deal with licenses, health and fire inspections, 18 percent on tax-related issues, 15 percent 
on securing government contracts, 12 percent for dealing with customs, 11 percent to 
facilitation connections to utilities and 2 percent to influence the design of legislation or 
                                                 
3 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/beeps/ 
4 This amongst firms which reported a percentage and did not answer “don’t know.”   6
regulation.
5  Such results suggest that petty bribery for infrastructure connections is 
somewhat of an issue in the region, and we will see that there is evidence to suggest 
construction industries are particularly susceptible to corruption in licensing, taxation and 
obtaining government contracts, in turn suggesting that infrastructure investment may be 
an area of concern. 
 
The BEEPS data provides evidence on what construction firms believe is typical payoff 
as a percentage of the contract value made for securing a government contract in their 
industry (Table 1).  From this we can estimate that the average perceived payoff for a 
government construction contract in the region is around 7 percent of the contract value 
(although we will see this number is uncertain).
6  It is worth noting here that reports of 
grand corruption vary significantly across industries.  The BEEPS data suggests that there 
is no significant correlation between cross-industry estimates of corruption and estimates 
of corruption given by the subset of construction industries at the national level (see 
Table 2).  We shall see that petty corruption in infrastructure also appears to be weakly 
correlated with more general measures of corruption.   
 
This suggests the importance of sector-level indicators to accurately report levels of 
corruption in construction and infrastructure in a particular country, however there is a 
paucity of cross-country data on estimates of both grand and petty corruption in 
infrastructure provision in particular.  Looking at petty corruption, around 20 World Bank 
Business Environment Surveys have asked infrastructure-related questions regarding the 
need to pay ‘gifts’ in order to get a water, electricity or phone connection.  With grand 
corruption, we have no cross-country comparable data of the extent of bribery in 
infrastructure firms.  BEEPS did not survey infrastructure firms, for example.  This 
reflects in part the concentrated nature of infrastructure provision which adds complexity 
to ensuring the anonymity of survey responses. 
 
Beyond perceptions and survey measures, indirect estimates can use measures of losses 
as a proxy for the extent of corruption, potentially capturing the impact of both petty and 
grand corruption.  In Andhra Pradesh, transmission and distribution losses were reduced 
from 38 to 26 percent 1999-2003 in large part through theft control and the regularization 
of 2.25 million unauthorized connections.  This strongly suggests that corruption was 
significantly linked to losses in this case.  In Bangladesh and Orissa, in India, around 55 
percent of generated power is paid for, the rest is lost to technical and commercial losses.  
Of this, perhaps 15-18 percent is accounted for by ‘true technical’ losses, suggesting 
leakage due to illegal connections or underbilling accounts for as much as 30 percent of 
generated power (Gulati and Rao, 2006).  Davis (2004) suggests that unaccounted for 
water accounts for 35 percent of total flows in India.   
 
                                                 
5 These are unweighted country average responses. 
6 This assumes mid-point values for the data ranges (2.5% for the 0-5% range, for example) and 30% for 
answers of ‘above 20 percent.’  The lowest possible estimate (assuming 0% for the 0-5% range, and so on) 
is four percent, the highest (assuming 5% for the 0-5 range and so on, and 100% for the ‘above 20%’ 
answer) is ten percent.     7
A related approach looks at levels of outputs compared to inputs in construction.  
Regarding grand corruption at the local level in infrastructure, Olken (2006) used 
measures of reported physical inputs and costs, surveyed labor inputs and costs and 
physical audits of outputs to determine that about 24 percent of expenditures in an 
Indonesian road-construction project were ‘lost.’  Canning and Fay (1996) report 
variations in the cost of construction of a kilometer of similar road that vary by as much 
as five to ten times.  Much of this will be due to differences from factors including 
location, some will also be due to less efficient, more corrupt procurement practices.  The 
ongoing World Bank effort to build a database of road construction and rehabilitation 
costs should help to provide benchmarks against which to estimate excess costs of 
construction.
7   
 
Public expenditure tracking surveys (which track the flow of resources through layers of 
government bureaucracy) are a potential approach to measuring the misappropriation of 
government funds if combined with unit-cost and quality of service data on final outputs.  
They have primarily been used in social sectors to date.  These surveys have found 
significant leakage of funds --between 30 and 76 percent of nonwage funds going to 
primary education in African countries, for example (Reinikka and Svensson, 2005).  A 
similar approach will be trialed by the World Bank in the water sector this year.   
 
There are a number of different ways to attempt to measure infrastructure corruption and 
its impact, then.  Results to date suggest that corruption in construction and connections 
may both be widespread.  The average firm in BEEPS survey countries in 1999 was 
spending perhaps 0.1-0.2 percent of revenues for unofficial payments to get utility 
connections, and corrupt payments to gain government contracts in construction appear to 
be frequent.  Although their scale is uncertain, anecdotal evidence suggests that 5 to 10 
percent of contract values may be a not unreasonable estimate in some countries.  Direct 
physical audits point to significant corruption in Indonesian roads projects adding up to 
as much as one quarter of project costs.  Indirect estimates suggest that corruption-related 
losses may amount to 30 percent of generated power in some countries.   
 
Our existing evidence is fragmentary and open to wide margins of error, however.  And, 
as the next section discusses, evidence to date suggests that perceptions measures in 
particular may not be able to provide any strong degree of accuracy regarding the extent 
and impact of corruption.   
 
 
Problems of Perception 
 
Perceptions measures designed to capture the extent of grand corruption appear 
reasonably stable over time, and they correlate with a number of objective indicators that 
we might expect them to correlate with (broad measures of development and factors such 
as the extent of regulation, for example).  Perceptions of corruption in a given country are 
also broadly correlated across different surveys (even when these survey noticeably 
different groups).  Nonetheless, there are reasons to believe that broad aggregate 
                                                 
7 http://www.worldbank.org/transport/roads/rd_tools/rocks_main.htm   8
perceptions indices are inaccurate, particularly in their use as proxies for corruption in 
infrastructure.   
 
It is important to emphasize that these indices measure perceptions of corruption, not 
corruption itself.  Argentina’s TI CPI rank dropped precipitously from 5.2 in 1995 to 2.8 
in 2002 (Seligson, 2005).  This may reflect declining governance, or perceptions may 
have been altered by the financial crisis, which began to unfold in 1999.  In Peru, tapes of 
the head of the National Intelligence Service bribing legislators and others precipitated a 
significant drop in the country’s Corruption Perceptions Index –it fell from 4.4 in 2000 to 
3.5 in 2004.  But it is worth noting that the collapse came after the tapes were released.  
There was no significant change in the index prior to the release of the tapes.  The 1998 
and 1999 rankings were 4.5, placing Peru ahead of the Czech Republic and the Republic 
of Korea, for example, even as over 1,600 Peruvians were receiving bribes from the 
intelligence service.  Furthermore, the CPI continued dropping even as national polls 
suggested that the percentage of transactions which involved paying a bribe fell from 6.4 
to 4.5 2002-2004 (Ausland and Tolmos, 2005).
8  This evidence that the CPI acts as a 
‘lagging indicator’ even during perhaps the largest corruption scandal in recent history is 
a concern, if the index is to be used to guide policy and investment decisions.
9 
 
As further illustration, Zimbabwe is a country that has seen a statistically significant 
increase in the perception of corruption over the period 1996-2004 according to the WBI 
control of corruption measure, for example (Kaufmann et. al., 2005).  It has also entered a 
more widespread period of a crisis of governance.  It is very plausible to imagine that this 
crisis of governance has increased levels of corruption, but it is also possible to imagine 
that a generally increased level of interest in the country and its broader problems has 
increased perceptions of corruption.  For example, a Factiva search of major news 
sources worldwide found that there had been a doubling of news stories on Zimbabwe 
between the 1996-2000 period and the 2000-2004 period (Table 3).
10  There had also 
been an increase in the percentage of stories which mentioned corruption –from 3.5 to 4.8 
percent.  This one third increase in the proportion of stories mentioning corruption is only 
about the same size as the increase in the percentage of stories mentioning Africa that 
also mentioned corruption, however.  Compare this to the tripling of stories mentioning 
Zimbabwe which also use the word ‘crisis,’ far ahead of the statistics for Africa as a 
whole.  Over 15 percent of stories mentioning Zimbabwe used the word ‘crisis,’ 
compared to less than 5 percent mentioning corruption.  It is surely plausible to argue that 
                                                 
8 We will see that there is evidence that the CPI correlates more closely with petty than grand corruption 
(Knack, 2006), but the Peru case is one example of the CPI not even tracking survey data on petty 
corruption very well.  More broadly, Svensson (2005) notes that cross-country survey evidence regarding 
incidence of bribes is not significantly correlated with expert perceptions once GDP per capita is taken into 
account.  Again, a survey of experts predicted that 54 percent of African respondents would suggest that 
they had been victims of corruption in the past year, whilst a population survey of Africans themselves 
suggested that only 13 percent reported being victims of corruption in the past year (Arndt and Oman, 
2006).  
9 Exacerbating this problem, and helping to explain the continuing decline in Peru’s CPI rank as other 
indicators suggested the corruption situation was improving, is that the CPI often incorporates data that is 
two to three years old. 
10 http://www.factiva.com/, search run 09/12/06.   9
the image of increased corruption is based at least as much on this widespread reporting 
of a crisis as much as it is on a far smaller increase in the percentage of stories discussing 
corruption itself.  Across countries, the fact that the WBI measure for control of 
corruption has a correlation coefficient of 0.95 with both WBI government effectiveness 
and rule of law measures suggests that it may be very difficult to tease out concerns 
regarding corruption with broader concerns regarding governance in general using 
perceptions indices (Thomas, 2006).   
 
This is not to argue that when respondents are asked to think about corruption, they in 
fact only think about general levels of crisis or weak governance –there is good evidence 
that this is not the case (Kaufmann et. al., 2006).  It is only to point out that general 
concerns abut a country are likely to play a significant role in responses to a question 
which is based on perceptions of an opaque, amorphous subject.  Aggregating 
perceptions scores from different sources does not necessarily improve the problem.  
Variation in sources for country scores within a given year and across years and lack of 
independence between sources both reduce accuracy.  This increases the magnitude of 
variation between scores required to declare a ‘statistically significant’ difference in 
perceived corruption –a variation which is already quite large.  It also makes comparing 
scores for a country over time problematic (Knack, 2006, Arndt and Oman 2006). 
 
Where we have estimates of the signal to noise ratio in corruption perceptions, the results 
are not reassuring.  Olken (2006) finds that villager perceptions of corruption in village 
road projects are correlated with objective measures of corruption estimated from 
expenditure tracking and physical audits of the roads (‘estimated corruption’), but the 
correlation accounts for little of the variation in perceptions.  A 10 percent increase above 
the mean in the objective measure of corruption (reflecting an increase in missing 
expenditures equal to 2.4 percent of total expenditures) is associated with an increase in 
the probability that a respondent would perceive corruption of 0.3 percent (from a 
baseline of 36 percent).  These are marginal effects, but if they held, this suggests that 
moving from no objective evidence of corruption in the project to the road not being built 
at all because 100 percent of expenditure went missing would increase the proportion of 
villagers who reported corruption by 12 percentage points.   
 
Personal characteristics were significantly more correlated with corruption perceptions 
than were levels of estimated corruption.  Beliefs about corruption in Indonesia were 
strongly correlated across different levels of government (those who believe the President 
was corrupt were far more likely to believe that the village head was corrupt).  Better-
educated and male respondents were much more likely to report corruption, and the 
impact of education, for example, on likelihood of reporting corruption was far greater 
than the impact of increases in estimated corruption in the project itself.   
 
Particularly significant as a determinant of perceived corruption at the project level was 
ethnic heterogeneity.  Moving from a village that was ethnically homogeneous to the 
most ethnically diverse village in the sample increased the likelihood of a villager 
reporting corruption in the project by 50 percentage points.  This bias is particularly 
important because estimated corruption was significantly negatively related to measures   10
of heterogeneity.  Moving from a village that was ethnically homogeneous to the most 
ethnically diverse village in the sample was associated with a decrease in the level of 
missing expenditures of 26 percentage points.  At least in this case, ethnic heterogeneity 
led to lower trust, perhaps as a result increasing monitoring which in turn reduced 
estimated corruption even as perceived levels of corruption were higher. 
 
Furthermore, the presence of public interventions designed to reduce corruption in the 
roads projects (inviting villagers to community meetings and providing anonymous 
comment forms) increased the perception of corruption in the project while doing 
comparatively little to reduce actual corruption.  The private threat of audits made to the 
project director did little to reduce perceptions of corruption but significantly reduced 
estimated corruption levels.   
 
In other words, even at the level of the village project, perceptions of grand corruption 
are a weak guide to actual levels of corruption and subject to systemic biases.  This 
problem is surely considerably larger at the level of the country, where the social distance 




Perceptions, Surveys and Outcomes 
 
This may be why evidence from survey instruments suggests that perceptions indices are 
poorly correlated with other measures of grand corruption.  Regarding country averages 
for the question ‘how often firms like yours need to make extra, unofficial payments to 
gain government contracts?’ answers to this question are correlated only weakly with 
Transparency International rankings (Table 4).  Looking at business environment datasets 
(Table 5), the results suggest that surveyed corruption in contracting is insignificantly 
related to TI CPI scores.  Transparency International corruption perceptions rankings 
correlate far more strongly with petty corruption questions in the BEEPS data than with 
grand corruption (the TI measure correlates better with payments for utility connections 
and licenses than with payments for government contracts, for example).  Knack (2006) 
demonstrates this result for the WBI corruption index as well as the TI measures.  But 
Knack also notes that, as measured by frequency and scale of reported bribes, petty 
corruption appears to be only weakly correlated to levels of grand corruption.     
 
We have seen that survey evidence suggests that corruption in construction and 
infrastructure is weakly correlated with general corruption levels.  Given in addition the 
weak relationship between surveyed general corruption levels and perceptions of 
corruption, it is perhaps unsurprising that there appears to be no link between surveyed 
measures of infrastructure corruption and general perceptions measures.  Table 4 suggests 
no link between construction firm BEEPS survey responses regarding corruption and the 
CPI.  Looking at petty corruption in infrastructure and CPI measures, the (little) available 
data suggests no significant correlation between perceptions of corruption in getting an 
electricity connection and CPI scores (Table 6).   
   11
Perhaps partially as a result, general perceptions measures are not robustly correlated 
with infrastructure outcomes.  For example, Estache et. al. (2006) report that a general 
measure of perceived country-level corruption is associated with lower energy use.  At 
the same time, they found telecoms access positively associated with perceived corruption 
while measures of access to water were not correlated either way with perceived 
corruption.
11   
 
 
Estimates of Petty Corruption in Surveys 
 
Surveys of service users appear to be a commonsense tool to estimate levels of petty 
corruption in infrastructure, given that the average respondent is likely to have personal 
experience of the transactions that can become corrupted.  Nonetheless, it is worth noting 
that even here, survey answers can apparently involve some uncertainty.  The Investment 
Climate Survey results suggest a very high correlation between cross-country estimates 
of corruption in getting connections to electricity, water and telephone services, despite 
considerably lower correlations with a number of other corruption variables (See Table 
6).  If the data reflects reality, it suggests that even despite the very different nature of the 
sectors (levels of competition, size of firms, involvement of the private sector and so on), 
corruption is determined almost solely by national-level factors that vary insignificantly 
between sectors.  Perhaps more plausibly, and given that we believe that corruption does 
significantly vary by sector, the data may reflect a common perception driven by 
anchored estimates rather than very similar levels of petty corruption.
12   
 
Significant variation within countries in the reported level of petty infrastructure 
corruption is suggested by the 1999 BEEPS survey.  The survey asks respondents how 
often firms like theirs have to bribe to get connected to public services such as telephone 
and electricity connections, with answers ranging between ‘always’ (given a value of 
one) and ‘never’ (given a value of six).  Figure 1 displays the average and standard 
deviation of answers to this question across countries, compared to the average answer 
across all countries.  As can be seen, only in the case of Estonia does the standard 
deviation not overlap with the cross-country average.   
 
There are notable country differences (the percentage of firms answering ‘never’ varies 
between 31 percent in Ukraine and 92 percent in Estonia).  Nonetheless, the variation in 
answers within countries is considerably larger than the variation across countries, to the 
extent that the great majority of average country responses are unlikely to be statistically 
                                                 
11 These results, positive and negative alike, are open to all of the usual concerns with econometric 
exercises regarding questions of causality and the stability of coefficients in the presence of 
multicolinearity and omitted variables.  Given that corruption is likely to be centered around urban water 
supply systems, it might be that better results would be uncovered using access to a private water 
connection in urban areas, but this data is available for fewer countries. 
12Anchoring is a problem common to survey work, and has a particular impact where questions are vague 
and respondents are unsure of the answer.  Anchoring involves answers to subsequent questions being 
considerably affected by an initial question or piece of information, even if it is completely irrelevant 
(Tversky and Khaneman, 1974).     12
significantly different from each other.
13  This may well reflect different interpretation of 
the intermediate categories (mostly, frequently, sometimes, seldom), but it is also likely 
to reflect the fact that different types of firm in different parts of the country face 
different risk of infrastructure corruption victimization.  As a result, while there is 
undoubtedly useful information in these survey responses regarding petty corruption in 
infrastructure that can be used for econometric analysis, this set of answers would not be 
suitable to determine differing policy positions or prescriptions at the sector level 
between countries. 
 
Uncertainty or within-country variation in response as well as, perhaps, the limited 
development impact of petty corruption in infrastructure, may account for the apparently 
weak relationship between surveyed petty corruption levels and infrastructure outcomes.  
Table 7 reports on correlations between answers to Business Environment Survey 
questions (the percentage of firms who say gifts are required for connections to 
infrastructure) and sectoral outcome indicators controlling for GDP per capita.  There is a 
positive and significant link between the reported extent of petty corruption in 
telecommunications and the waiting list for a telephone mainline.  Otherwise, the 
relationship between our indicators of infrastructure outcomes and measures of petty 
corruption are insignificant.
14  It should be emphasized that all of these results cover a 
very small number of observations (11-23 countries).  Nonetheless, based on the data we 
have and as with earlier studies linking general corruption perceptions measures to 
infrastructure outcomes, infrastructure-specific survey measures of petty corruption also 
appear to be weakly related to outcomes.  We will see that this may be in part because the 
form of petty corruption caught by such surveys may be some of the least damaging in 
terms of outcomes. 
 
 
How Much Can Surveys Tell Us about Grand Corruption? 
 
The approach of surveying firms which are likely to be directly involved in grand 
corruption again appears likely to produce more accurate measures than perceptions 
indices.   
 
Once more, there remain difficulties with these surveys too, however.  Not least is the 
issue of honest and accurate reporting.  Direct questions asking business owners to 
estimate the percent of their own costs that are accounted for by bribe payments can illicit 
considerably different responses as a result of these problems.  Henderson and Kuncoro 
                                                 
13 The average of within-country standard deviations is 1.2 compared to the standard deviation of country 
averages which is 0.4. 
14 Although there are better dependent variables for water, and non-technical losses would be a better 
dependent variable for electricity (again, this is not available for as many countries).  We also have some 
(very) preliminary evidence of a link between estimates of corruption in construction and infrastructure 
outcomes for roads from Investment Climate Survey data.  Table 2 reports that average percentages 
reported for the value of a gift required to secure a government contract reported by investment climate 
surveys is negatively and significantly correlated with the percentage of a country’s roads which are paved 
after controlling for GDP per capita.  Once more, this is a weak proxy for quality, but available for more 
countries than better measures.  Source: http://iresearch.worldbank.org/ics/jsp/index.jsp.   13
(2006) suggest that differences in survey design and technique account for the difference 
in estimates of corrupt payments between 10.5 percent of costs found in their survey of 
Indonesian firms and 3 percent of profits found by the Indonesian Annual Survey of 
Medium and Large Enterprises.  The problem of accuracy may be magnified when 
questions are less specific, or asked about ‘firms like yours,’ or levels of corruption in 
general. 
 
The BEEPS survey data allows us to see how significant such issues of interpretation, 
specificity and insufficient knowledge might be, even in perhaps the strongest survey that 
covers corruption issues.  The survey asks for the percentage of firm sales to the state 
sector and the unofficial payments made by firms in that industry to secure government 
contracts as a percentage of government contract values.  The product of these two 
responses should be a reasonable indicator of respondent estimates of the percentage of 
total revenues paid in unofficial payments to secure government contracts for firms like 
theirs.  The survey also asks for the percentage of total revenues accounted for by all 
unofficial payments and the percentage of those unofficial payments which are used to 
secure government contracts.  The product of these two responses should also be a 
reasonable indicator of respondent estimates of the percentage of total revenues paid in 
unofficial payments to secure government contracts for firms like theirs.  One would 
hope that these two different measures would be approximately equal: 
 
(bribes for government contracts as a percentage of revenues) 
≈ 
(percentage of firm sales to state) * (percentage of government contract values paid in bribes)   
≈ 
 (percentage of revenues paid in bribes) * (percentage of bribes paid to secure government contracts) 
 
Answers to the questions regarding total revenues accounted for by all unofficial 
payments and unofficial payments on government contracts as a percentage contracts 
were both measured in bands in the 1999 survey (0%, 0%<>1% and so on).
15  In order to 
perform analysis we take the response as equal to the midpoint of the band.  In the case of 
the last indicator in both cases (>25%) the answer is assumed to be 35%.  This will create 
noise in the estimates, a subject returned to below.  There are 297 firms from the BEEPS 
database with the requisite data and more than 25 percent of sales to government (such 
firms should be better informed about the size and extent of bribery for contracting with 
government).  This provides us with two estimates from the same firm of total payments 
to secure government contracts as a percentage of revenue.    
 
A simple regression takes the product of percentage of total revenues in unofficial 
payments multiplied by percentage of unofficial payments to secure government 
contracts as the dependent variable and the product of percentage of contracts in bribes 
multiplied by percentage of sales to government as the independent variable.  If 
respondents were answering consistently based on accurate knowledge of firm revenues 
and levels of corruption, we would expect a coefficient of one, an R-squared close to one 
and an intercept near zero.  In fact, the independent variable enters highly significantly, 
                                                 
15 This has changed in subsequent versions of BEEPS.   14
but with a coefficient of 0.23, while the intercept, at 0.65, is significantly different from 
zero and the R-squared is 0.14 (see Figure 2).
16  Reversing the approach, with percentage 
of government contracts paid in bribes multiplied by percentage of sales to the state as 
the dependent variable, the coefficient rises to 0.6, however the intercept also rises, to 2.1 
(with a 95 percent confidence interval of 1.6 to 2.6).  This is worth comparing to the 
average value for the dependent variable of 2.9. 
 
Given the issue of measurement in bands, it might be better to calculate the lowest and 
highest potential percentage of revenues going to bribes for government contracts by each 
method and calculate in what percentage of cases the two bands overlap (see Figure 3 for 
an illustration).  Using this method, 54 percent of estimates overlap.  This number drops 
to 46 percent of estimates amongst firms which report some level of bribe payments as a 
percentage of government contract values.
17  The results in part reflect different average 
estimates produced by the two calculations of bribes for contracts as a percentage of 
revenues.  The product of percentage of total revenues in unofficial payments multiplied 
by percentage of unofficial payments to secure government contracts averages 1.3 
percent.  The product of percentage of contracts in bribes multiplied by percentage of 
sales to government averages 2.9 percent.
18 
 
There is some considerable level of information in the survey results regarding the extent 
of corruption in government contracting, then.  Nonetheless, there is also considerable 
noise and/or bias (as is usual in surveys), suggesting the need for caution in use of the 
results.  Beyond banding, further noise is added by the fact that respondents are 
sometimes asked to consider their company and sometimes firms ‘like theirs’.  Some 
questions refer to sales, some to contracts and some to revenues.  Nonetheless, the results 
surely also suggest some uncertainty about the usual size of bribe payments to secure 
government contracts on the part of respondents.   
 
Again, amongst the firms surveyed by BEEPS were 376 construction companies.  We can 
use the data to examine the differences between construction firms and others when it 
comes to corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Table 8).  It appears that 
construction firms in the sample think it is more common to pay bribes in their industry 
than do firms in other industries, that firms like theirs spend a larger percentage of 
revenues on bribes, and they bribe more frequently to get licenses, deal with taxes and get 
contracts.  Adding a number of controls, it appears (unsurprisingly) that private 
construction firms where the state is the largest customer are likely to report particularly 
                                                 
16 It is worth noting that this is not a test of a model, but what should hopefully be an identity relationship.  
Not all sales to government involve a formal contract, this may account for some of the variation between 
the two estimates. 
17 i.e. assuming that the answer to question 30 is not 1.   
18 The ranges based on the minimum and maximum answers from banded responses are 0.8 to 2.0 for the 
first estimate and 1.8 to 4.7 for the second estimate.  It is worth emphasizing this overlap (the standard 
deviations of the averages also overlap).  This may suggest that the most plausible range for the percentage 
of revenues going to bribes for this group of firms is 1.8-2.0.   15
high corruption in their industry (Table 9).
19  These results are highly statistically 
significant, again suggesting the utility of the survey approach. 
 
At the same time, the BEEPS survey was not designed to provide a large dataset for 
exploring construction alone, and it is perhaps unsurprising that, partially as a result, 
evidence regarding the variation in corruption across countries in the sector is not strong.  
As we have seen, one of the BEEPS questions is “when firms in your industry do 
business with the government, how much of the contract value would they typically offer 
in additional or unofficial payments to secure the contract?”  Answers, expressed as a 
range of percentages of the contract value, are on a six point scale from zero to above 
twenty percent.  Taking construction firms in the 1999-2000 BEEPS dataset which 
answered this question, we can see how much the answers tell us about sector-level 
corruption using country dummies.  All but nine firms out of 143 report some level of 
bribery.  How much of the variation in estimates of industry corruption by firms in this 
industry across countries is explained by which country the respondent is in?  If 
construction firms were perfectly informed about the typical level of corrupt payments to 
government in their industry in their country and they understood and answered the 
question in the same way, we would expect 100 percent of the variation in answers to be 
explained by the country of residence of the respondent.  In fact, around 14 percent of the 
variation can be explained, and none of the country dummies is statistically significant 
(Table 10, see Figure Four for Cross-Country variation compared to standard 
deviations).
20  This performance is similar if we limit the analysis to private firms or to 
private firms which deal with the government.   
 
A similar finding applies to the answer to the question “how often do firms like yours 
nowadays need to make extra, unofficial payments to government officials to gain 
government contracts?’ –which is available for a considerably larger number of firms 
(Table 11).  The variation explained by country dummies, which one would hope to be 
very high, is in fact very low (with an R-squared of 0.1).  The results apply even if we 
remove those firms that say companies never pay such bribes, suggesting that reticence 
about reporting such behavior does not lie behind the result.  Overall, this suggests that 
we can say little with statistical confidence about which countries in the 1999 BEEPS 
dataset have more corrupt construction industries than average based on questions asking 
construction firms themselves how corrupt their industry is.   
 
It should be noted that the variation will be large enough to show that construction in 
Azerbaijan (the worst performer) is significantly more corrupt than the best countries 
(Uzbekistan, Poland and Estonia).
21  And the survey results are useful for further 
econometric analysis of the causes and consequences of corruption.  However, the survey 
                                                 
19 Although within a subsample of construction industry firms, it appears that firms that do not deal with 
the government estimate the size of bribes paid on government contracts as being significantly smaller than 
do firms who deal with the government. 
20 The F-stat. is 1.43 
21 It is also worth noting that this situation may be considerably better with the larger samples of the 2005 
dataset.   16
was not designed for, and would not be suitable for, strongly differentiating levels of 
corruption within sectors across countries. 
 
Questions are not exact, and open to subjective interpretation.  One cannot expect one 
person in a company to have perfect knowledge of company revenues, contract sizes and, 
in particular, the size of bribes paid.  Furthermore, there are many different types of 
construction firm, and they will frequently be working with different levels of 
government or different departments within those levels.  But if these factors are what 
accounts for the variability of responses, it suggests the danger of assuming one indicator 
can accurately gauge levels of corruption even regarding one distinct activity at the level 
of the sector (let alone all activities at the level of the country).  This suggests the danger 
of using even survey evidence as an ‘actionable indicator’ of levels of corruption. 
 
Survey responses are likely to be the most plausible method to determine the extent and 
level of payments linked to petty corruption in infrastructure and grand corruption in 
construction.  At the same time, even answers regarding petty corruption have to be 
treated with some care.  Furthermore, there is significant evidence that corruption 
payments vary considerably across and within sectors within the same country, 
suggesting the need for surveys with large enough samples of construction industries and 
specific enough questions to allow for inter-sectoral analysis.  Finally, the firm survey is 
likely to be an inappropriate instrument to illuminate grand corruption within utility 
firms, because infrastructure provision tends to be so concentrated. 
 
 
Its Not How Much You Divert, But How You Divert It That Matters 
 
Even were data on the size and frequency of payments significantly improved, a focus on 
such payments may underestimate and misplace the economic damage done by 
corruption in infrastructure projects.  One source of mis-estimation is to confuse the 
financial and economic costs of bribe payments themselves.  Payments are not a 
‘deadweight loss,’ in that bribe recipients can and do spend the money (this is sometimes 
how they are caught).  More importantly, the major damage done by corruption is 
probably not the narrow financial loss of bribe payments but the economic cost in terms 
of skewed spending priorities, along with substandard construction and operation.   
 
Imagine a road project that costs $1 million to build but generates $320,000 in economic 
returns each year after construction for 10 years.  The project’s overall economic rate of 
return is about 30 percent (the average ERR for World Bank transport projects exiting 
FY97-02).  If the project had suffered from collusive bidding, and this had raised the 
price of construction by 20 percent, to $1.2 million, the project’s ERR would drop to 26 
percent.
22  This is a significant decline, but it still leaves the project at more than double 
the ‘hurdle rate’ of a 10 percent ERR.
23   
 
                                                 
22 This (and subsequent calculations) view the corrupt payment as a transfer but accounts for a (high) 
marginal cost of government funds lost to corruption of 1.50 (a fifty percent deadweight loss). 
23 This is approximately the economic impact of poor road construction suggested by Olken (2004).   17
Imagine instead that the bidder agreed a contract price of $1 million, but used insufficient 
and substandard materials to build the road, spending only $800,000 on construction and 
pocketing the remaining $200,000.  This reduces the road’s traffic capacity so that yearly 
economic returns fall by a quarter.  It also shortens the useful life of the road to five 
years.  This would reduce the overall ERR to 15 percent.  The same financial level of 
corruption has a considerably larger economic impact in this case, reducing the ERR by 
15 percent rather than 4 percent. 
 
What if construction firms had used $200,000 to pay off legislators to divert money from 
operations and maintenance funds for the construction of this road, and recouped their 
expenditure through overbidding or poor construction?  At this point, with the new road 
project sucking up resources from maintenance of existing roads, reducing traffic 
capacities and road life across the network, economic rates of return might turn negative.    
 
In short, the nature of corruption can have a significant impact on the economic damage 
caused by that corruption, even if the financial losses are the same size.  Bribery 
payments which are made to deliver quality projects and services at inflated prices may 
be far less damaging than corrupt activities which impact the quality of delivery or the 
type of projects undertaken. 
 
Benjamin Olken’s (2004) experiment in Indonesia, monitoring corruption in road 
construction, provides a real-world example.  In the case study by Olken, nearly all of the 
corruption took the form of missing quantities, not price mark-ups.  The prices that 
project managers reported paying for goods were the prices actually paid.  Project 
managers made corrupt incomes by purchasing lower quantities or stealing construction 
materials.  Olken trials two approaches to the reduction of corruption in road-building --
extending project audits and encouraging greater community participation.  In both cases, 
the cost in terms of money and time of the anti-corruption interventions is larger than the 
financial cost saving from reduced theft of materials and wages by corrupt officials.  In 
other words, using a purely financial metric of the benefits of anti-corruption activities 
based on the cost of the activity and the size of the theft suggests that the best approach is 
no approach –it isn’t worth the cost of trying to reduce corruption.   
 
Taking a broader view of the impact of corruption suggests a markedly different 
conclusion, however.  Olken estimates that a marginal dollar of materials stolen from a 
road project reduces the discounted benefits from the project by $3.41 because of the 
shorter life of the road when built with insufficient material.  When accounting for the 
reduced value of the road due to corruption, the net benefit of both anti-corruption 
interventions becomes positive.  The fully-costed $500 expenditure on an audit produces 
gross economic benefits of $1,155, for a net benefit of $655, for example. 
 
At the national level, the recent rural investment climate survey in Indonesia reported that 
a growing percentage of the country’s road network is falling into disrepair.  This is in 
part because of a considerable and growing misallocation of financing from maintenance 
to construction.  At the start of the 1990s, road maintenance accounted for about 47 
percent of the central government grants to districts for roads. By the end of the decade   18
this had dropped to 15 percent.  Expenditures should be more than seventeen times their 
current level to maintain the existing road stock in good condition.  It is plausible to 
imagine this misallocation is connected in some part to the incentives created by 




Looking at petty corruption in the water sector, those unconnected to the water grid 
frequently pay ten or more times the amount per liter for water than do connected 
consumers.  Willingness to pay valuations in India suggest that even very poor people 
would pay more to keep water services and considerable amounts (as much as twice 
current average water bills) to see improved service quality (Dutta, 2005).
25  The 
consumer surplus to a (quality) connection is large.  This is, of course, why people are 
willing to bribe for a legal or illegal connection to the supply --$2.64 per connection in 
India, for example.   
 
These figures are significant, but in some part they involve payments for services that 
undercompensated water staff should be providing anyway –they are a transfer to get the 
job done, perhaps one of the least harmful forms of corruption.  Compared to payments 
that encourage illegal activities, or payments to avoid law enforcement, payments to 
encourage legal activities have less impact on economic outcomes (see Figure 5).  
Furthermore, compared to official connection charges of around $140 (Franceys, 2005) 
or a monthly water bill in Delhi averaging about $1.29, willingness to pay figures 
considerably larger and a tenfold price difference between connected and unconnected 
consumers, illegal connection payments are not so significant in and of themselves.  It is 
clear that even after speed payments, there is a considerable consumer surplus to a water 
connection.  That corruption reduces the quality of water services and diverts connections 
is likely to be a far larger source of economic harm than the scale of petty bribes for 
connections.  This may help to account for the apparently weak connection between petty 
bribes and sector outcomes that we observed earlier. 
 
Again, a macroeconomic perspective suggests that the major impact of corruption in 
infrastructure is usually going to be on what is built where, not how much is paid to build 
or connect it.  The incentives to spend money on building infrastructure rather than 
operations and maintenance, the incentive to build poor quality infrastructure in the 
wrong place and the incentives to poorly operate it probably account for the bulk of the 
negative development impact of corruption.
26  Such incentives may help to explain cross-
country evidence suggesting an impact of weak institutions and high corruption out of all 
proportion to a ten or twenty percent mark-up in the costs of investments.  Indeed, the 
cross-country evidence suggests a real return to public investment in Africa that is 
insignificantly different from zero (Devarajan et. al. 2002).  Of course, this is due to a 
                                                 
24 It is worth noting that where there is a risk of catastrophic failure absent O&M, not only is maintenance 
carried out more regularly but also cost recovery is more prevalent –compare road transport with air 
transport or energy. 
25 See also Komives et. al. 2005 
26 An important case of corruption creating incentives to poorly operate infrastructure will be in the case of 
payments to avoid environmental regulation, which is likely to have a significantly larger economic impact 
than the deadweight loss of corruption payments.   19
number of factors beyond corruption, but it is likely that the skewed incentive structure in 
which corruption plays a role (and is a symptom) is a significant part of this low return.
27  
Differences across countries in the types of corruption (damaging or less so) that are 
prevalent may also account for what appears to be a complex and context-specific 
relationship between general measures of corruption and growth outcomes across 
countries (Rock and Bonnett, 2004). 
 
Nonetheless, our knowledge about levels of particularly harmful corruption in 
infrastructure (that which involves diversion and substandard construction) is minimal.  
As we have seen, existing measures of corruption available across countries and regions 
tend to be based on perceptions, which tend (if anything) to measure the extent of the 
petty corruption that interviewees experience directly.  Again, we have seen that most 
individuals and even firms appear only partially informed as to the extent of ‘grand’ 
corruption involving officials and contractors.  Construction and infrastructure corruption 
varies considerably across countries with similar scores on overall country-level 
measures of corruption.  And finally, all of the usual measures of corruption relate to the 
extent and scale of bribe payments.  They do not provide information on the type of bribe 
payment, the level of theft of materials, the construction codes being ignored and so on.  
Without such measures we can say little about the extent of the most damaging forms of 
corruption in infrastructure across different countries.
28   
 
 
What Does This Mean for Measurement of Corruption in Infrastructure? 
 
Of course, such measures will be some of the hardest to uncover.  They are not part of 
everyday experience, so they are difficult to pick up in general surveys.  Even large-scale 
company surveys such as BEEPS do not yet tackle the non-financial elements of 
corruption.  The response should not be to ‘live with the measures we have,’ however, as 
these are likely to be poorly designed to determine the extent of the problem and the 
success of remedial actions in infrastructure.  One approach would be to look at the most 
damaging consequences of corruption, which are more easily measurable. 
 
Minimizing the damage done by corruption involves countering the incentives to build 
the wrong thing and to build and then operate it badly.  If this is our concern, we should 
focus attention on macro-sectoral issues such as overall budgeting and project selection 
and on physical auditing of the status of physical capital.  We should see if budgets are 
adequate (and paid) for operations and maintenance, if O&M is actually carried out in a 
way that maintains infrastructure quality, if the process for selecting projects picks those 
with high economic return and if the new infrastructure is well constructed.  If all of these 
conditions are met, we will know that the impact of corruption in infrastructure on overall 
                                                 
27 In Bank projects, a one standard-deviation increase in the Kaufman-Kraay rule of law measure increases 
the chance of a successful project by sixteen percentage points (Dollar and Levin, 2005) 
28 Grand corruption, at least, may be a comparatively ineffective substitute for lobbying.  Campos and 
Giovanni (2006) use the BEEPS data to suggest that firms which lobby more bribe less and report far 
higher levels of influence over government decisionmaking.  It may be, then, that governance reforms 
which increase the potential for lobbying will have a negative development impact even if they 
simultaneously reduce levels of corruption.   20
development will be comparatively small.  This suggests a focus on medium-term 
expenditure frameworks, public expenditure tracking surveys and physical audits as key 
corruption measurement tools in infrastructure. 
 
An advantage of such an approach is that it may be easier to find good metrics than in the 
case of sector- and type-specific direct corruption indicators.  Rather than relying on 
perceptions or expert intuition, an approach that relies on inputs and outputs can use 
objective indicators.  We have good benchmarks for the cost of maintaining different 
classes of road, for example.  Is the national budget putting aside adequate resources to 
fully maintain the country’s road network based on those benchmarks?  We have many 
years of experience in project evaluation which should allow us to determine if project 
selection in a given sector appears to be following rational procedures or is driven by 
other concerns.  It is a comparatively simple engineering task to determine if a road or 
pipeline has been constructed and maintained adequately or poorly through a physical 
audit.
29  Further work is needed (and is underway) in the area of sectoral approaches to 
corruption that could flesh out such ideas (see Table 12), but the model provided by 
REDIs (Recent Economic Developments in Infrastructure) already incorporates much of 
the required analysis for such an approach.
30 
 
Such a measurement approach would involve errors of commission and omission.  The 
‘wrong’ project can be selected on the grounds of political interest absent private gain.  
Poor construction and maintenance can be the result of incompetence and inefficiency as 
well as corruption.  But the project still remains the ‘wrong’ project, for whatever reason 
it was selected.  Poor construction and maintenance remains a significant drag on 
development performance whatever its cause.  And as suggested by the very high 
correlations between the perception-driven measures of corruption and governance that 
we have, disentangling different types of governance failure will be a very difficult, and 
quite possibly mistaken, exercise regardless.  As a result, the errors of commission are 
comparatively minor in terms of the indicators’ abilities to measure overall development 
impact.   
 
Regarding errors of omission, it may be that well-built projects involve corruption which 
raises the price of construction or that consumers accessing well-maintained networks 
still have to make speed payments or are illegally connected.  This is, of course, a 
legitimate issue of concern.  Measuring contract prices against benchmarks and business 
and customer surveys can play an important role in uncovering and measuring such 
corruption.  But it is worth repeating that his type of corruption is likely to be less 
damaging in terms of development impact.
31 
 
                                                 
29 For example, in the Philippines, physical audits combined with a GIS system are being used to determine 
if roads and bridges actually exist and what state they are in as part of a drive towards improved transport 
governance.  Furthermore, especially at the level of project selection and measurement of infrastructure 
quality, there is no need to survey 100 percent of proposed projects or infrastructure stocks –a random 
representative sample would suffice to suggest if the sector is performing well.   
30 REDIs or equivalents have been completed in a number of countries including Colombia and Morocco. 
31 Of course, this will depend on the level of such payments –if they start doubling contract prices, for 
example, they will become a serious issue, but luckily also much easier to spot.   21
At the same time, we should extend and expand survey work, increasing the focus on 
petty corruption in infrastructure and grand corruption in construction.  Accuracy will be 
improved if surveys are either limited to or large enough to be representative for a 
particular subsector, clients of a particular firm or suppliers to a particular ministry or 
department (indeed BEEPS have doubled in size since the 1999 survey used in this 
paper).
32  With petty corruption, the role for increased use of consumer scorecards and 
other consumer survey methods is considerable.  There may also be a role for 
survey/interview instruments aimed at international infrastructure providers that might 
allow for anonymous data collection regarding grand corruption in infrastructure 
provision itself. 
 
Even with more survey work, however, it is likely that if want measures for ‘progress’ in 
sector level anti-corruption efforts aimed at grand corruption in infrastructure in 
particular we should also use more easily measured output indicators which have been 
related to corruption variables rather than the variables themselves (measures such as 
percentage of roads in good condition, transmission and distribution losses).  Output 
measures may better indicate reduction in development impact of corruption in 
infrastructure and greater ease of measurement for such indicators will allow for more 
accurate determination of change over time.  
 
 
What Does This Mean for Anti-Corruption Policy? 
   
Robust general findings from surveys which apply to the infrastructure sector are useful 
for general policy advice.  For example, firm survey data tend to suggest that companies 
that face more red tape and/or spend more time dealing with government pay more in 
bribes (Gaviria, 2002, Henderson and Kuncoro, 2006, Renikka and Svensson, 2006).  
Again, BEEPS data suggests that bribery was more common to get connected to 
electricity and telecommunications for firms in less democratic slow-growing countries 
with less-developed infrastructure, public ownership of utilities and limited competition 
(Clarke and Xu, 2002).  These results match broader findings regarding where corruption 
is likely to be more common, and might suggest broad reform approaches to reduce the 
extent and impact of corruption  -transparency, participation, competition, reduced 
discretionary powers, removal of unnecessary regulation, improved financial 
management and extended auditing (Cavill and Sohail, 2007, Seldadyo and de Haan, 
2005, Lederman et. al., 2005).
33  
 
                                                 
32 In order to gauge and improve accuracy approaches might include: surveys should ask directly 
comparable questions (not switching between ‘firms like yours’ and ‘your industry,’ for example); they 
should ensure specificity if necessary through careful definition as part of the question; question order 
should vary between firms; there should be multiple approaches to asking the same question in different 
ways (including ‘anchored’ and ‘unanchored’ responses); and interviewers should re-survey some 
respondent after the passage of time and ask multiple respondents from the same firm (again, done with 
subsequent BEEPS).  One might want to vary questions between banded and exact response rates, although 
exact response questions are likely to illicit lower levels of response (Lynn et. al., 2005).   
33 Estache et. al. (2006) suggest the conditional impact of reform (privatization and independent regulation) 
is to reduce the impact of perceived corruption on energy access (although it has no effect on water).     22
At the same time, we need to be aware of the limits of our empirical knowledge about 
corruption in infrastructure, and so the limits to our policy responses.  On the one hand, 
there appears to be very strong anecdotal evidence that bribery for government contracts 
is the norm in many countries.  On the other hand, firm surveys suggest that the 
frequency or scale of bribes differ dramatically within the same industry in a country.  
This is a sign of the fragility of our knowledge regarding corruption even in an area 
where it is widely agreed to be a major development problem.  It is possibly a sign that 
corruption is ‘ad hoc’ and opportunistic suggesting that anticorruption approaches may 
need to vary considerably within sectors and between countries.  As a result, we need to 
be cautious in drawing cross-country sector policy conclusions from analysis based on 
corruption perceptions alone or even limited survey evidence. 
 
It may be particularly unwise to use cross-country or cross-time analysis of the extent of 
corruption based on perceptions as a tool for aid targeting or differential project design 
requirements especially at the sectoral level.  The existing sectoral data is inadequate for 
such a task and this is unlikely to change in the near term.  Again, if corruption indicators 
are required for targeting or policy requirements, it is likely that objective indirect 
measures that reflect broader weaknesses of governance will be a better instrument at 
least until repeated large-scale infrastructure-specific surveys are carried out.  Objective 
input measures might also have a role to play –perhaps including some Doing Business 
indicators on business regulation, or Global Integrity measures regarding the institutions 
of good governance.
34  It should be noted, however, that these are not infrastructure-
specific, and their relationship to governance outcomes is not firmly established. 
 
Tools for a broad approach to improved governance in infrastructure would focus on 
improving budget, maintenance and project selection and implementation processes with 
a primary focus on quality.  This will encompass state-owned enterprise reform, 
improved regulation (including transparency, participation and low-discretion rules) and 
increased competition (for and in the market as well as yardstick competition).  It would 
highlight improved and more transparent processes for budgeting, project selection and 
oversight, including community-driven approaches.  At both the sectoral and project 
level, one important element is likely to be a focus on paying for outputs based on 
independently verified physical audit.   
 
A lens that focuses on the development impact of corruption suggests that a single 
project-focused and in particular a procurement-focused approach may be inappropriate.  
O&M budgets in many developing countries are too low to sustain existing stocks of 
infrastructure –as reflected in poor indicators of quality.  At the same time, donor projects 
are ‘cherry picked’ –the most attractive investment projects from the point of view of 
economic returns.  These two facts help to reconcile high ERRs estimated for donor 
projects in Africa with very low overall returns to public investment and limited 
macroeconomic returns to aid.  Low O&M budgets and many poor project choices are 
both likely to be in some part connected to incentives created by poor governance and 
corruption.  Taking a project approach to corruption would miss both of these impacts, 
which are frequently at the core of corruption’s overall development impact.   
                                                 
34 http://www.doingbusiness.org/, http://www.globalintegrity.org/   23
 
Furthermore, a procurement-centered approach is likely to miss a good deal of the 
corruption directly related to a project, including some of the most harmful forms.  Theft 
of materials and bribes to cover up construction code violations both occur after the 
procurement process is complete, for example.  The project may also generate 
downstream corruption in the form of petty bribes for connections, or tax and customs 
avoidance.  As we have seen, these forms of corruption can make up the bulk of bribe 
payments and may also account for a considerable proportion of the economic harm 
caused.
35   
 
Any comprehensive anti-corruption strategy in infrastructure should start at the level of 
the sector rather than the project or the procurement, then.  The usual focus on the scale 
of improper payments and theft centers attention on particular anti-corruption strategies 
in projects --methods to benchmark construction prices to detect overbidding, for 
example.  We should additionally focus on tools to reduce the most damaging 
consequences of corruption, because if these consequences are avoided, we will know 
that the impact of corruption in infrastructure on overall development will be 
comparatively small.   
 
The issues of collusion or bid-rigging that raises contract prices and the issue of speed 
payments or bribes for illegal service remain significant development problems 
themselves, not least through their impact on trust in governance and reduced appetite of 
quality contractors to bid.  Procurement procedures, price benchmarking, transparency, 
civic engagement, investigation --the full panoply of prevention and detection methods 
should be used to reduce corruption in construction that raises prices and encourages 
petty corruption.  But if the right projects are selected and the resulting infrastructure is 
well built and maintained, the potential development impact of corruption is considerably 
reduced.  Perhaps this broader concern with sector governance should be the main focus 
of the Bank’s anticorruption agenda in infrastructure.   
 
                                                 
35 Having said that, good contract design, especially if it involves output-based payments, can significantly 
reduce the potential development impact of corruption.   24
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Table 1: BEEPS: When firms in your industry do business with the government, 
how much of the contract value would they typically offer in additional or unofficial 
payments to secure the contract? Sample of construction firms 
 
Bribe Size  % Responses 
0% 9






   27
Table 2: BEEPS: Correlation between average country answer across industries and average country answer for construction 
for three corruption variables 
          
     Constant 
Average 
across 
industries   
It is common in my line of business to have to 
pay some irregular 'additional payments' to get 
things done(1=always 6=never)     Coefficients  2.44  0.36 
 
   P-value  0.08 0.27   
   Adj  R2  0.01     
   OBS  26     
On average, what percentage of revenues do 
firms like your typically pay per annum in 
unoffical payments to public officials? (1=0% 
7=>25%)   Coefficients  2.70  0.25 
 
   P-value  0.00 0.32   
   Adj  R2  0.00     
   OBS  25     
When firms in your industry do business with 
the government, how much of the contract 
value would they typically offer in additional 
or unofficial payments to secure the contract? 
1=0%, 6=>20%)    Coefficients  2.79  0.00 
 
   P-value  0.00 0.99   
   Adj R2  -0.05    
   OBS  24    
 
Note: dependent variable is the average country answer for construction firms, independent variable is answer 
for all firms.  
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Table 3: Zimbabwe, Corruption and New Stories 
 
News Stories That Mention…  Africa Zimbabwe 
 
Which also mention…      
Corruption (%)  1996-2000  2.3 3.5
 2000-2004  3.1 4.8
Crime (%)  1996-2000  3.1 1.9
 2000-2004  3.4 3.2
Crisis (%)  1996-2000  6.1 6.5
 2000-2004  6.9 15.8
Search from Factiva, 08/30/06, covering stories in 'major news' outlets as defined by 
Factiva: "Sources covering general news and business news that are considered key 
publications in their region by virtue of circulation or reputation."  Total number of 
stories: Africa 1996-2000 304,495 2000-2004 419,855; Zimbabwe 1996-200 34,917 
2000-2004 71,265. 
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Table 4: BEEPS and Transparency International CPI 




DV: How often do firms like yours need to make extra, unofficial 
payments to gain government contracts? (1=always 6=never) 
IV: Transparency International Ranking 
Sample: country averages (26 Obs) 
 
5.55* -0.005** 0.17 
DV: How often do firms like yours need to make extra, unofficial 
payments to get licences and permits? (1=always 6=never) 
IV: Transparency International Ranking 
Sample: country averages (26 Obs) 
 
5.45* -0.006*  0.32 
DV: How often do firms like yours need to make extra, unofficial 
payments to gain government contracts? (1=always 6=never) 
IV: How often do firms like yours need to make extra, unofficial 
payments to deal with taxes and tax collection? (1=always 6=never) 
Sample: construction firms (322 Obs) 
 
2.91* 0.46*  0.35 
DV: How often do firms like yours need to make extra, unofficial 
payments to gain government contracts? (1=always 6=never) 
IV: Transparency International Ranking 
Sample: construction firm country averages (26 Obs) 
 
4.30 0.005  0.00 
 
*, **, ***significant at 1, 5, 10 percent 
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Table 5: Investment Climate Questions on Contract Corruption: Correlations 





DV: Value of gift expected to secure government contract (% contract 
value) 
IV: Transparency International CPI 








DV: Value of gift expected to secure government contract (% contract 
value) 
IV: % managers ranking corruption as a major constraint to doing business 
Sample: country averages (44 Obs) 
 
-0.11 0.08*  0.34 
DV: Value of gift expected to secure government contract (% contract 
value) 
IV: GDP per capita (log) 
Sample: country averages (50 Obs) 
 
6.65*** -0.50  0.01 
DV: Transparency International CPI 
IV: GDP per capita (log) 
Sample: country averages (50 Obs) 
 
-3.04* 0.74*  0.42 
DV: % managers ranking corruption as a major constraint to doing 
business 
IV: GDP per capita (log) 
Sample: country averages (43 Obs) 
 
131* -11.6*  0.25 
DV: % managers ranking corruption as a major constraint to doing 
business 
IV: Transparency International CPI 
Sample: country averages (48 Obs) 
 
58.9* -8.42*  0.17 
 
*, **, ***significant at 1,5, 10 percent 
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Table 6: Investment Climate Questions on Electrical Connection Corruption: Correlations 
 




DV: % Firms expected to give gift to get an electrical connection 
IV: Value of gift to get a government contract (%)  
Sample: country averages (20 Obs) 
 
14.2* 0.1  -0.05 
DV: % Firms expected to give gift to get an electrical connection 
IV: % Firms expected to give gift to get a telephone connection 
Sample: country averages (21 Obs) 
 
5.36*** 0.71*  0.71 
DV: % Firms expected to give gift to get an electrical connection 
IV: % Firms expected to give gift to get a water connection 
Sample: country averages (15 Obs) 
 
4.88*** 0.84*  0.64 
DV: % Firms expected to give gift to get an electrical connection 
IV: % Firms expected to give gift to get a construction permit 
Sample: country averages (17 Obs) 
 
0.26 0.91*  0.76 
DV: % Firms expected to give gift to get an electrical connection 
IV: Transparency International CPI 
Sample: country averages (21 Obs) 
 
22 -1.56  -0.04 
DV: % Firms expected to give gift to get an electrical connection 
IV: % Managers ranking corruption as a major barrier  
Sample: country averages (13 Obs) 
 
2.86 0.14  0.07 
 
*, **, ***significant at 1,5, 10 percent 
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Table 7: Investment Climate Questions on Infrastructure Corruption: Correlations 
 
  Constant  Log GDP per 
Capita 
Corruption Adjusted  R2  N 
DV: log mobile phones/1,000 
IV: firms expected to give gifts to get 
a phone connection 
 
-3.16** 1.00*  -0.00  0.72  21 
DV: waiting list for telephone 
mainlines 
IV: firms expected to give gifts to get 
a phone connection 
 
-1.52  0.18 0.02*  0.61 11 
DV: % population with access to 
improved water source 
IV: firms expected to give gifts to get 
a water connection 
 
-7.32 11.4**  -0.34 0.51  15 
DV: % managers who rank electricity 
as a major constraint to doing 
business 
IV: firms expected to give gifts to get 
an electricity connection 
 
123*  -12.0**  0.32 0.77 13 
DV: % of roads paved 
IV: Value of gift expected to secure 
government contract 
 
1.28 0.34**  -0.16*  0.44 33 
IV: Independent Variable, DV: Dependent Variable, GDP/capita data is from 2002 in PPP from WDI 
*, **, ***significant at 1,5, 10 percent   33
 
Table 8: Corruption in BEEPS:  How are Construction Firms Different? 
 
Average 
Construction Average  All 
Construction 





It is common in my line of business to have to pay some irregular 
‘additional payments’ to get things done  3.9 4.2  0.69  -0.39  0.00 
On average, what percentage of revenues do firms like yours pay in 
unofficial payments? (1=0, 7=over 25%)  3.5  3.2  0.38  0.29  0.00 
How often do firms like yours need to make extra, unofficial payments to 
get connected to public services? (1=always 6=never)  5.2  5.2  0.42  -0.09  0.24 
How often do firms like yours need to make extra, unofficial payments to 
get licences and permits? (1=always 6=never)  4.8  5.0  0.46  -0.19  0.02 
How often do firms like yours need to make extra, unofficial payments to 
deal with taxes and tax collection? (1=always 6=never)  5.1 5.1  0.50  -0.13  0.09 
How often do firms like yours need to make extra, unofficial payments to 
gain government contracts? (1=always 6=never)  4.7  5.1  0.77  -0.56  0.00 
How often do firms like yours need to make extra, unofficial payments 
when dealing with customs/imports? (1=always 6=never)  5.2  5.1  0.38  0.01  0.91 
How often do firms like yours need to make extra, unofficial payments 
when dealing with courts? (1=always 6=never)  5.2 5.2  0.58  -0.07  0.34 
How often do firms like yours need to make extra, unofficial payments to 
influence the content of new laws, decrees or regulations? (1=always 
6=never) 5.7  5.6  0.46  -0.04  0.46 
Of total unofficial payments that a firm like yours would make in any 
given year, what percentage to gain government contracts? (%)  23.0  15.4  0.20  11.92  0.00 
When firms in your industry do business with the government, how much 
of the contract value would they typically offer in additional or unofficial 
payments to secure the contract? (1=0%, 6>25%)  2.8  2.6 0.63 0.31  0.00 
 
Notes: BEEPS data.  ‘average construction’ and ‘average all’ are unweighted averages of country average scores for construction and all firms.  
Construction<all is the percentage of countries where the average score for a given question is lower for construction than for all firms.  ‘Construction coeff’ and 
‘construction prob.’ refer to coefficients and probabilities on a dummy variable for a firm being in construction from a regression of the question as the d.v., a 
constant and the construction dummy for all firms in BEEPS (no country dummies). 
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Table 9: All firms in BEEPS:  What Determines Corrupt Payments? 














sales to state 
(%) 
On average, what percentage of 
revenues do firms like yours pay in 
unofficial payments? (1=0, 7=over 
25%)  Coefficients  2.06  0.40  0.30  0.04 0.15 0.00 
  P-value  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.65 0.06 0.03 
How often do firms like yours need 
to make extra, unofficial payments 
to gain government contracts 
(1=always 6=never)  Coefficients  5.44  -0.52  -0.58  0.11 0.36 0.00 
  P-value  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.17 0.00 0.45 
Of total unofficial payments made 
by a firm like yours, what 
percentage paid to gain government 
contracts? (%)  Coefficients  30.12 3.16  11.05  -3.56  -10.68  0.05 
  P-value  0.00  0.09  0.00  0.02 0.00 0.07 
On government contracts, what 
percentage of contract value would 
a firm in your industry offer in 
unofficial payments to secure the 
contract?(1=0 6=>20%)  Coefficients  2.14 0.13  0.32  0.03  -0.02  0.00 
  P-value  0.00  0.22  0.00  0.76 0.81 0.18 
 
Note data from BEEPS, no country dummies, number of observations varies between 1,253 and 3,207. 
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Table 10: Construction Firms in BEEPS: When Firms in your industry do business with the government, how much of the 
contract value would they typically offer in additional or unofficial payments to secure the contract? (1=0, 6>20%) 
Significance of country dummies 
 
  All Firms      Private Firms    Private which Trade with Gov't   
   Coefficients  P-value    Coefficients P-value    Coefficients P-value      
Intercept  2.91  0.00   3.00  0.00   3.00  0.00     
Azerbaijan  0.71 0.08    0.33 0.51             
Czech Republic  0.09  0.83    0.00 1.00    0.43 0.61       
Estonia  -0.51  0.19   -0.69  0.09   -0.67  0.41     
Poland  -0.64  0.13   -0.73  0.09   -0.88  0.29     
Russia  -0.48  0.15   -0.52  0.15   -0.52  0.49     
Slovakia            -1.00 0.29       
Turkey  -0.11  0.77   -0.26  0.49   -0.13  0.87     
Ukraine  -0.24  0.53   -0.21  0.60   -0.10  0.90     
Uzbekistan  -0.69  0.08   -0.70  0.11   -0.67  0.41     
(Slovakia Excluded)      (Slovakia Excluded)    (Azerbaijan Excluded)     
                     
  Adj R2  0.09    Adj R2  0.02    Adj R2  0.02       
  Observations  143  Observations  125   Observations  87     
                     
Construction firms, subsample of countries with more than ten construction companies 1=0% 6=>20% (Don’t 
know/Don’t do business with government excluded)        
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Table 11: Construction firms in BEEPS: How often do firms like yours nowadays need to make extra, unofficial payments to 
public officials to gain government contracts? 1=Always 6=Never, Significance of Country Dummies 
  Full Sample      Excluding Never (6)   
Dummy (never=0 always-
seldom=1) 
   Coefficients  P-value    Coefficients P-value    Coefficients P-value 
Intercept  5.32  0.00   5.00  0.00   0.27  0.01 
Azerbaijan  -1.15  0.01   -1.75  0.23   0.39  0.00 
Estonia  -0.47  0.31   -1.38  0.35   0.21  0.12 
Georgia  -0.07  0.88   -1.00  0.50   0.10  0.46 
Hungary 0.63  0.20          -0.22  0.13 
Kyrgyzstan       -1.50  0.33       
Latvia  -0.20  0.67   -1.44  0.33   0.09  0.53 
Poland  -0.23  0.60   -1.73  0.24   0.06  0.64 
Russia  -0.37  0.34   -1.93  0.18   0.08  0.46 
Turkey  -1.57  0.00   -2.24  0.12   0.42  0.00 
Ukraine  -0.52  0.22   -2.69  0.07   0.05  0.68 
Uzbekistan  -0.28  0.54   -1.50  0.31   0.11  0.41 
  Kyrgyzstan excluded    Hungary Excluded    Kyrgyzstan excluded 
                
  Regression Statistics    Regression Statistics    Regression Statistics 
  Adjusted R2  0.07    Adjusted R2  0.03    Adjusted R2  0.07 
  Observations  361   Observations  143  Observations  361 
Construction firms, subsample of countries with more than twenty construction companies 1=Always 6=Never 
(Don’t know excluded) 
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Table 12: Approaches to Measuring the Development Impact of Weak Governance and Corruption in Infrastructure 
Overall Budgeting   
Are general budget priorities 
correct? 
Benchmark analysis of budgeting priorities –O&M versus new investment 
Are resources reaching targeted 
activities? 
Public expenditure tracking surveys 
Investment Cycle   
Are good projects selected?  Economic and technical analysis of representative set of sector investments.  Analysis of 
legal/political process of selection, interviews with key officials 
Are projects well executed?  Physical and financial audit of representative sample of recent projects, cost benchmarking, 
survey of intended beneficiaries, interviews with key officials, contractors, losing bidders 
Licensing and Regulation   
Are licenses issued correctly, fairly  Economic and technical analysis of process, interviews with key officials, industry 
associations, company surveys 
Are standards met?  User surveys, interviews with licensee staff, physical audits. 
Operation  
Are facilities well 
operated/maintained? 
User surveys, interviews with key staff, physical audits. 
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Notes: X-axis crosses at average value for answer, chart displays average and standard deviation for each country, see Table 12 for additional notes.   42
Figure Five: More and Less Harmful Bribes 
Bribe Paid On the 
Basis of… 
Status of Act Performed/Not Performed in 
Return for Bribe 
 





Speed payment for 
legal connection 
 













Contract award to 
(other) non-
competitive bidder, 
disconnection of 
legal service 
 
 